“Quando habitaverint fratres simul, et unus ex eis absque liberis mortuus fuerit, uxor defuncti non nubet alteri : sed accipiet eam frater ejus, et suscitabit semen fratris sui :”
“If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger : her husband's brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of an husband's brother unto her. her husband's: or, her next kinsman”
“When brothers dwell together and one of them dies without a son, the widow must not marry outside the family. Her husband’s brother is to take her as his wife and fulfill the duty of a brother-in-law for her.”
“If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies, and has no son, the wife of the dead shall not be married outside to a stranger. Her husband’s brother shall go in to her, and take her as his wife, and perform the duty of a husband’s brother to her.”
“If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no son, the wife of the dead shall not be married without unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother unto her.”
Ruth 4:3 ; Matt. 22:24 ; Mark 12:19 ; Luke 20:28 Because the Hebrew word signifieth not the natural brother, and the word that signifieth a brother, is taken also for a kinsman: it seemeth that it is not meant that the natural brother should marry his brother’s wife, but some other of the kindred that was in that degree which might marry.
Together, as the sons of Juda did: (Genesis xxxviii. 8,) though custom (Calmet) and analogy extend this to other brothers, at least to those who live in the promised land, and have the inheritance in common, as appears from the history of Ruth, Ruth i. 13, &c. Noemi supposes that all the sons whom she might have had, would have been under the same obligation towards her daughter-in-law. The Rabbins restrain this law as much as they can, asserting that if the deceased left an adopted or natural child, the brother need not marry his widow, nor was any obliged but the next in age, and not married. St. Justin (q. 132,) teaches the reverse. (Calmet) — Half-brothers were included, (Menochius) and indeed every relation, in order, who, upon the refusal of the next heir, wished to take possession of the deceased person’s land, Ruth iv. (Haydock) — The Jews no longer observe this law, as they have not possession of Chanaan. (Cuneus i. 7.) — Fagius asserts that it was neglected after the captivity of Babylon, because the inheritances were confounded. (Calmet) — This, however, does not seem to have been the opinion of those who have undertaken to reconcile the genealogy of our Saviour, given by Sts. Matthew and Luke, by supposing that St. Joseph was the son of Jacob by birth, and of Heli according to the law. (St. Hilary) Africanus says, (Ep. to Aristides) that “Heli dying without issue, Jacob was obliged to marry his widow, by whom he had Joseph, a descendant of Solomon by Jacob, and of Nathan by Heli,” as their common mother, Esta, had married successively Mathan and Melchi, (or rather Mathat) who sprung from those two branches of David’s family. (Dupin) (Haydock) — The Athenians followed a similar regulation with respect to orphan young women, whom the next of kin were bound to marry and to endow. The Tartars assert their right to marry the widows of their brethren. The Egyptians did not consider the marriage as real, nor any relationship contracted, in case the woman had no issue, on which principle there was no impediment to prevent the brother from marrying the widow of his brother. On other occasions such contracts were declared illegal, Leviticus xviii. 16. (Calmet) — This was a positive law, (Worthington; Genesis xxxviii.) which admitted of an exception.
Here is, I. The law settled concerning the marrying of the brother's widow. It appears from the story of Judah's family that this had been an ancient usage (Gen 38 8), for the keeping up of distinct families. The case put is a case that often happens, of a man's dying without issue, it may be in the prime of his time, soon after his marriage, and while his brethren were yet so young as to be unmarried. Now in this case, 1. The widow was not to marry again into any other family, unless all the relations of her husband did refuse her, that the estate she was endowed with might not be alienated. 2. The husband's brother, or next of kin, must marry her, partly out of respect to her, who, having forgotten her own people and her father's house, should have all possible kindness shown her by the family into which she was married; and partly out of respect to the deceased husband, that though he was dead and gone he might not be forgotten, nor lost out of the genealogies of his tribe; for the first-born child, which the brother or next kinsman should have by the widow, should be denominated from him that was dead, and entered in the genealogy as his child, v. 5, 6. Under that dispensation we have reason to think men had not so clear and certain a prospect of living themselves on the other side death as we have now, to whom life and immortality are brought to light by the gospel; and therefore they could not but be the more desirous to live in their posterity, which innocent desire was in some measure gratified by this law, an expedient being found out that, though a man had no child by his wife, yet his name should not be put out of Israel, that is, out of the pedigree, or, which is equivalent, remain there under the brand of childlessness. The Sadducees put a case to our Saviour upon this law, with a design to perplex the doctrine of the resurrection by it (Matt 22 24, etc.), perhaps insinuating that there was no need of maintaining the immortality of the soul and a future state, since the law had so well provided for the perpetuating of men's names and families in the world. But, 3. If the brother, or next of kin, declined to do this good office to the memory of him that was gone, what must be done in that case? Why, (1.) He shall not be compelled to do it, v. 7. If he like her not, he is at liberty to refuse her, which, some think, was not permitted in this case before this law of Moses. Affection is all in all to the comfort of the conjugal relation; this is a thing which cannot be forced, and therefore the relation should not be forced without it. (2.) Yet he shall be publicly disgraced for not doing it. The widow, as the person most concerned for the name and honour of the deceased, was to complain to the elders of his refusal; if he persist in it, she must pluck off his shoe, and spit in his face, in open court (or, as the Jewish doctors moderate it, spit before his face), thus to fasten a mark of infamy upon him, which was to remain with his family after him, v. 8-10. Note, Those justly suffer in their own reputation who do not do what they ought to preserve the name and honour of others. He that would not build up his brother's house deserved to have this blemish put upon his own, that it should be called the house of him that had his shoe loosed, in token that he deserved to go barefoot. In the case of Ruth we find this law executed (Ruth 4 7), but because, upon the refusal of the next kinsman, there was another ready to perform the duty of a husband's brother, it was that other that plucked off the shoe, and not the widow—Boaz, and not Ruth.
Verses 5-12 The custom here regulated seems to have been in the Jewish law in order to keep inheritances distinct; now it is unlawful.